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ABSTRACT
This note argues that the Seventh Circuit’s deviation from years of precedent in FTC v. Credit
Bureau is an improper interpretation of Supreme Court precedent. For decades, Section 13(b) has
allowed the Federal Trade Commission to be able to pursue equitable monetary orders in the form
of restitution and disgorgement as ancillary relief to permanent injunctions. The Seventh Circuit
put an abrupt end to these powers relying on Supreme Court precedent that has never been used in
this manner. If this circuit split continues to exist, it will create a great disparity in the Federal
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Trade Commission’s ability to bring enforcement actions against those who have wronged
consumers and potentially impacts other federal agencies. This Seventh Circuit precedent must be
reversed in order to preserve fairness in the marketplace and ensure consumers can be quickly and
fully redressed when wrongful acts are committed.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is backed into a corner in which they must choose
whether they want to stop a wrongful actor immediately and forgo monetary relief or give the
wrongful actor the ability to continue their actions through administrative proceedings in hopes
they can put a stop to it and redress those who were wrong. The question in this note is whether,
given significant developments in the Supreme Court concerning federal agency remedial
authority, the courts should break with wide and longstanding precedent that construed the FTC's
injunctive authority to authorize restitution and disgorgement.1 Circuit courts are now split on
this issue, as the Seventh Circuit recently broke with every other circuit when reaching this
question in holding that the FTC lacks authority to pursue restitution and disgorgement.
In August 2019, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals put a stop to the FTC’s ability to
pursue equitable monetary orders under Section 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (the
Act), overruling thirty years of circuit precedent without an en banc hearing.2 This decision
relied on Supreme Court precedent from Meghrig v. Kentucky Fried Chicken Western.3 This
Supreme Court case from 1996 examined whether a citizen suit under the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act allowed for restitution for prior cleanup costs when the statute stated that there

1

15 U.S.C § 53(b) (2020)

2

FTC v. Credit Bureau Ctr., LLC, 937 F.3d 764 (7th Cir. 2019); cf. id. at 786, 797 (Wood, C.J., dissenting) (noting
Circuit Rule 40(e), requiring en banc review to overturn circuit precedent; “The court’s refusal to rehear this case en
banc has, I fear, led us into error.”).
3

Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1251 (1996).
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needed to be imminent danger to the environment and individuals.4 Ultimately, the Supreme
Court held that because the language of the statute required an imminent risk of harm at the time
the suit was filed and the statute provided an “elaborate enforcement provision,” the statute could
not be interpreted to allow Meghrig to recover restitution from Kentucky Fried Chicken Western
for costs previously incurred to restore the property.5 The Seventh Circuit, in its opinion, was
attached to the idea that there could not be implied powers if a statute already contained an
elaborate enforcement provision - ignoring that this precedent had only been applied by the
Supreme Court in cases involving citizen suits for environmental protections.6 If this Seventh
Circuit position becomes law, the FTC’s, and likely other federal agencies’, powers would be
vastly weakened, and their ability to protect consumers would dwindle.
Section 13(b) of the Act allows for the FTC to pursue preliminary and permanent
injunctions against any party that violates a law the FTC has the authority to enforce.7 For
decades, the FTC pursued equitable monetary orders and injunctive relief in their actions brought
under Section 13(b).8 This power is not explicitly stated within the statute, but has been provided
through case law to the FTC in order to ensure it is fully capable of exercising its powers to

4

Id. at 1252.

5

Id. at 1256.

6

Middlesex Cty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l. Sea Clammers Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. 2615, 2622 (1981) (Precedent cited by
Supreme Court in Meghrig stating that “in recent decisions concerning the recurring question whether Congress
intended to create a private right of action under a federal statute without saying so explicitly. The key to the inquiry
is the intent of the Legislature.”).
7

8

15 U.S.C 53(b) (2020).

FTC v. H. N. Singer, Inc., 668 F.2d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 1982). This is the first case where the FTC was permitted
to use equitable monetary orders under 13(b). The Court states “Because the authority to issue a preliminary
injunction rests upon the authority to give final relief, the authority to freeze assets by a preliminary injunction must
rest upon the authority to give a form of final relief to which the asset freeze is an appropriate provisional remedy.”.
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protect consumers.9 This is a crucial power because without it, the FTC’s authority under Section
13(b) is purely prohibitory and prospective, and can neither fully deter bad conduct nor redress
consumers.
When the FTC pursues equitable monetary orders, it ordinarily takes the form of
restitution,10 which seeks to make those who were harmed whole again by taking money from
the wrongdoer and returning it to the victims. Equitable monetary orders may also take the form
of disgorgement,11 which looks to deter wrongdoers by stripping them of any profits they have
received and placing the funds into the U.S. Treasury.12 The main difference between these two
forms of relief is their focus. The goal of restitution is to return the ill-gotten gains to the victims,
while disgorgement has no such goal. The FTC is not clear on why they pursue one over the
other, but it is likely determined by how easily the victims can be identified and compensated, as
well as how costly it would be to provide such compensation. Courts consistently rule in favor of
the FTC in matters regarding their ability to pursue these forms of relief under Section 13(b),13

9

See id.

10

FTC v. Ross, 743 F.3d 886 (4th Cir. 2014) (the Fourth Circuit upheld an award to the FTC for restitution as
ancillary relief to Section 13(b). This was because Ross was found to have engaged in selling deceptive internet
“scareware” to consumers. This software told consumers it was running a virus scan but when it completed it told
them that their computers were infected with viruses, spyware and illegal pornography when it never actually ran
any scans).
11

FTC v. Certified Merch. Servs., 126 F. App'x 651 (5th Cir. 2005) (the Fifth Circuit upheld an award of
disgorgement in favor of the FTC as ancillary relief to Section 13(b). Certified Merchant Services “CMS” processed
credit card transactions. When presenting their business to potential customers they led them to believe that they ran
“FTC-approved audits” which they were not authorized to do, and the FTC alleges that they broke their fiduciary
duty to customers. The district court enjoined the actions of CMS and ordered disgorgement of twenty percent of
their profits).
12

Disgorgement, Wex, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/disgorgement;Restitution, Wex,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/restitution.
13

David C. Vladeck, TIME TO STOP DIGGING: FAILED ATTACKS ON FTC AUTHORITY TO OBTAIN
CONSUMER REDRESS, 31 Antitrust ABA 89.
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and at this time, every circuit but the Seventh allows for the FTC to provide these forms of
relief.14 This power has been constantly challenged, however,15 with most parties claiming “that
Section 19 of the Act--which authorizes the FTC to seek monetary redress in court after final
judgments in FTC administrative cases--limits the relief available under Section 13(b).”16 These
arguments have continuously been rejected by courts because Section 19 was enacted two years
later than Section 13(b), and Section 19(e) clearly states “remedies provided in this section are in
addition to, and not in lieu of, any other remedy or right of action provided by State or Federal
law.”17
The FTC is not the only agency that has its ability to pursue equitable monetary orders as
ancillary relief to permanent injunctions challenged. The Securities and Exchange Commission

FTC v. Direct Mktg. Concepts, Inc., 624 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2010) (aff’d district court order for summary judgment in
favor of FTC requesting a permanent injunction and restitution against defendant who made false claims about
dietary supplements); FTC v. Moses, 913 F.3d 297 (2d Cir. 2019) (aff’d district court order for summary judgment
in favor of the FTC requesting a permanent injunction and restitution against defendant who violated the Fair Debt
Collections Act); FTC v. Magazine Solutions, LLC, 432 F. App’x. 155 (3d Cir. 2011) (aff’d district court order in
favor of FTC requesting a permanent injunction and restitution when defendant falsely advertised magazine
subscriptions); FTC v. Ross, 743 F.3d 886 (4th Cir. 2014) (aff’d district court order for a permanent injunction and
restitution when defendants were found to have engaged in deceptive internet advertising practices); FTC v.
Certified Merch. Servs., Ltd., 126 F. App'x 651 (5th Cir. 2005) (aff’d district court order for a permanent injunction
and disgorgement of profits when defendant was found to have engaged in deceptive business practices as a credit
card processor); FTC v. Voc. Guides, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82308 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 9, 2006) (Sixth Circuit
district court case, ordered a permanent injunction and restitution against defendant who engaged in deceptive
business practices against the USPS); FTC v. Sec. Rare Coin & Bullion Corp., 931 F.2d 1312 (8th Cir. 1991) (aff’d
district court order for a permanent injunction and restitution against defendant who misrepresented the value of
coins they were selling to consumers); FTC v. AMG Capital Mgmt., LLC, 910 F.3d 417 (9th Cir. 2018) (aff’d district
court order for a permanent injunction and restitution against defendant who changed the terms on payday loans
after individuals started paying on them); FTC v. Freecom Commc’ns, Inc., 401 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir. 2005) (in
reversing the district court’s award for attorney fees to defendant, the Court recognized that the FTC had the power
to pursue injunctions and restitution under Section 13(b)); FTC v. WV Universal Mgmt., LLC, 877 F.3d 1234 (11th
Cir. 2017) (aff’d district court order for a permanent injunction and disgorgement against defendant who engaged in
fraudulent business practices by charging victims credit cards claiming it would lower their interest rates); In re
Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 289 F.3d 98 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (aff’d district court order for disgorgement
under against pharmaceutical manufacturer engaging in illegal licensing agreements and drug pricing).
14

15

See id.

16

Vladeck, supra.

17

15 U.S.C § 57b(e) (2020).
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(SEC)’s authority to do so is currently under fire in Liu v. SEC, which was heard by the Supreme
Court in March 2020. Petitioners argued in their brief that because SEC disgorgement is punitive
in nature “it is against the general principles of equity to aid in the enforcement of penalties.”18
In short, the petitioners argued that because SEC disgorgement is a penalty, a court should not be
able to issue disgorgement as ancillary equitable relief.
The Supreme Court and the other eleven circuits should reject the Seventh Circuit’s break
from tradition. This note consists of four parts and argues that the FTC should have the authority
to pursue equitable monetary relief under Section 13(b) of the Act. Part II of this note examines
the history which justifies the FTC having this power under Section 13(b). Part III will look at
the justifications for the FTC continuing to have this power and Part IV will be concluding
remarks.
II.

BACKGROUND

A. History of Section 13(b)
During the late 1960s, Congress began to see the FTC as an ineffectual enforcement
agency.19 Section 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act originated from a 1969 report
from the American Bar Association (ABA), which found that the FTC failed to address retail
fraud adequately.20 The ABA and FTC both believed that the FTC lacked the ability to properly
pursue fraud cases because it lacked jurisdiction in federal court and did not have access to
18

Liu v. SEC, 2020 WL 6977158 Pet’r’s Br. 20.

19

Gerald G. Udell, The FTC Improvement Act, 41 No. 2 J. of Marketing 81 (1977).

20

David R. Spiegel, Chasing the Chameleons: History and Development of the FTC's 13(b) Fraud Program, 18
Antitrust, 43 (2004) (citing Report of the ABA Commission to Study the Federal Trade Commission 50-54 (1969),
The FTC asserted that it lacked jurisdiction in bringing fraud cases and even if it could bring fraud cases the FTC
lacked proper remedies).
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proper remedies.21 In 1974, the power of the FTC was weakened even further by the Ninth
Circuit in Heater v. FTC.22 The Ninth Circuit held that the FTC did not have authority to order
those who violated Section 5 to issue refunds to those they harmed.23 Previously, it had been a
regular procedure for the FTC to mandate refunds in the cease and desist orders, and it is
believed that the Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act was a direct response to this
Ninth Circuit ruling.24 Congress added Section 13(b), amongst other amendments, to the Federal
Trade Commission Act on November 16, 1973 as a rider to an amendment of the Mineral
Leasing Act of 1920.25 Congress enacted these amendments with the purpose of improving the
FTC’s ability “to deal with unfair consumer acts and practices.”26
Congress enacted Section 13(b) with the purpose of providing an alternative to
cumbersome administrative proceedings under Section 5.27 Section 5 prohibits “unfair methods
of competition.”28 The term was left undefined in order to allow the FTC to adapt to new
business practices as they arise.29 Section 5 is enforced before administrative law judges.30

21

Id.

22

Heater v. FTC, 503 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1974).

23

Id. at 327.

SA Hildebrandt, Heater v. FTC and the Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act: The FTC’s Power to Order
Restitution, 1975 DUKE L. J. 379 (1975).
24

25

Pub. L. No. 93-153, § 408(f).

26

S. REP. No. 93-151, at 30-31 (1973).

27

Id.

28

15 U.S.C § 45(a)(1) (2020).

29

Marcy C. Priedeman, Section 5 of the FTC Act: Dark Cloud or Silver Lining?, 19 Competition: J. Antitrust &
Unfair Competition L. Sec. St. B. Cal. 69, 70 (2010).
30

16 C.F.R. § 3.42 (2020).
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Section 13(b) was intended to be an alternative to administrative proceedings, and was meant to
enable the FTC to pursue preliminary and final injunctions to prevent firms from continuing in
their unfair practices.31 The purpose of this section is to allow the FTC to move quickly in
district court to freeze assets and secure preliminary injunctive relief to prevent further injury
and, when proper, provide permanent injunctive relief.32 The Senate Committee on Commerce
specifically states the goal for Section 13(b) was for “Commission resources [to] be better
utilized, and cases [to] be disposed of more efficiently.”33
The legislative history of this 1973 amendment indicates that the original text of Section
13(b)(2) was to be read that when the FTC has reason to believe a firm has engaged or is about to
engage in a violation of Section 5, it may seek a District Court order
enjoining thereof pending the issuance of a complaint by the Commission under
Section 5, and until such complaint is dismissed by the Commission or set aside by
the court on review, or until the order of the Commission made thereon has become
final within the meaning of Section 5, would be in the interest of the public.34
Congress then amended this language before enacting it to the current language of Section
13(b).35 The key difference is the lack of any mention of a Section 5 proceeding in the language
of Section 13(b)(2). Congress almost modified this section again in House Report 7917 Section
204.36 However, the FTC and the Senate opposed the changes, and in the end were not passed

31

S. REP. No. 93-151, at 44.

32

Id. at 30-31.

33

Id.

34

Id. at 44.

35

36

Pub. L. 93–153, § 408(f).

H.R. REP No. 93-1107, at 55 (1974) (proposing an amendment to the Federal Trade Commission Act specifically
stating “The Commission strongly prefers the language of P.L. 93-153 to that of Section 204 of H.R. 7917. Section
204 would cut back on recently acquired authority to seek injunctions to halt anti-competitive practices. For these
reasons, we urge that Section 204 be deleted from H.R. 7917.”
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because they intended to cut back on the FTC’s authority37 by only allowing injunctions in cases
involving fraud.38 The House Report specifically states that the Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce refused to “cut back” on the FTC’s newly-found powers and requested no
modifications be made to Section 13(b).39 When the final bill was enacted, this amendment was
dropped and the exact language of Public Law 93-153 was the final form adopted.
B. Historical Antecedents of the FTC’s Disgorgement Power
1. Supreme Court Precedent
When the Ninth Circuit first recognized the FTC’s disgorgement power in 1982,40 it
justified its decision in part on much older authority, including common law equitable remedies
created by the Supreme Court as far back as 1836.41 Courts traditionally found this power in their
obligation to “secure complete justice.”42 It has been affirmed over and over to ensure that courts
can continue to be able to do so.43
The case that established these common law equitable remedies was Brown v. Swann.44
Brown involved a complex procedural uncertainty concerning how equitable relief under state

37

S. REP No. 93-1107, at 55 (1974).

38

Id. at 67.

39

H.R. 7917 at 55.

40

668 F.2d 1107 (1982).

41

Brown v. Swann, 35 U.S. 497 (1836).

42

Id. at 503.

43

Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946); Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288
(1960); Kansas v. Nebraska, 574 U.S. 445 (2015) (These three cases affirm the concept that courts have of wide
range of equitable principles they are able to invoke to ensure complete justice).
44

35 U.S. 497 (1836).
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usury statutes should be obtained, but in the course of its decision, the Court emphasized that
courts have broad remedial power.45 In its holding, the Court stated that “securing complete
justice[] should not be yielded to light inferences, or doubtful construction.”46 This quote has
been interpreted to mean that if a statute does not restrict the power of the courts to provide relief
in equity, then courts have the power to do so.47 This concept of complete justice is exactly what
the FTC is pursuing when it brings action for injunctions and equitable monetary orders under
Section 13(b).
The Supreme Court again brings up the concept of “complete justice” from Brown in
1946.48 Porter v. Warner Holding Co. was a case regarding the Emergency Price Control Act of
1942 and had no connection to the FTC.49 The Office of Price Administration50 sought to enjoin
Warner Holding Company from charging rent in excess of that permitted by the Emergency
Price Control Act,51 as well as restitution for excessive rent charged.52 The District Court
enjoined Warner Holding but declined to order restitution. 53 The Eight Circuit affirmed, finding

45

Id. at 499.

46

Id. at 503.

47

668 F.2d 1107 (1982).

48

328 U.S. 395 (1946).

49

Id. at 396.

50

National Archives, Records of the Office of Price Administration, (Mar. 8, 2020 10:00 AM),
https://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/188.html#188.1 (The Office of Price Administration
was a federal agency under the Office of Emergency Management established to enforce price controls during and
after WWII.).
51

Id.

52

328 U.S. 397 (1946).

53

Id.
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no authority under the statute to order restitution.54 In affirming Brown, the Supreme Court
reversed, holding that restitution was necessary to ensure compliance with the act.55 The Court
held that
“[u]nless a statute in so many words, or by a necessary and inescapable inference,
restricts the court’s jurisdiction in equity, the full scope of that jurisdiction is to be
recognized and applied. The great principles of equity, securing complete justice,
should not be yielded to light inferences, or doubtful construction.”56
Brown was cited by the Supreme Court in 1960 in Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry.57
This was a case brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The Secretary of Labor, on
behalf of employees of Robert De Mario Jewelry, brought action against their employer seeking
an injunction against retaliatory discrimination as well as restitution in the form of
reimbursement of lost wages.58 The Fifth Circuit reversed this decision, claiming that the district
court did not have the authority to order this restitution under the FLSA.59 The Supreme Court
reversed, citing both Porter and Brown, explaining that courts have access to these non-textual
powers to “secure complete justice.”60 The Court ordered that a “[d]istrict [c]ourt has jurisdiction
to order an employer to reimburse employees, unlawfully discharged or otherwise discriminated
against, for wages lost because of that discharge or discrimination.”61As stated by the Supreme

54

Id.

55

Porter, 328 U.S. 403 (1946).

56

Id. at 398

57

361 U.S. 288 (1960).

58

Id. at 289-91.

59

Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 260 F.2d 929, 934-35 (5th Cir. 1958).

60

61

361 U.S. 291 (1960).
Id. at 296.
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Court in Brown, Porter, and Mitchell, if Congress has not clearly foreclosed the ability of a court
to issue relief in equity, they have the authority to do so.
2. Legislative History for the FTC Pursuing Equitable Monetary Orders
In all of its amendments to the Federal Trade Commission Act since Singer in 1982,
Congress has only ever expanded the FTC’s enforcement powers, and has never disturbed the
monetary recovery powers recognized by courts, even when modifying Section 13 itself, and
even when explicitly acknowledging those powers themselves.
The first case in which the FTC successfully pursued equitable monetary orders was in
1982.62 Articles were published discussing the FTC pursuing these orders as early as 1988. In
1994, Congress amended the Federal Trade Commission Act and did not remove the FTC’s
power to enjoin or to pursue restitution and disgorgement. Instead, Congress expanded their
venue and service of process.63 Congress inserted language into Section 13(b) which allowed the
FTC to add defendants to suits without having to worry about whether or not venue was proper.64
This amendment to the Federal Trade Commission Act also came after the FTC began using
Section 13(b) for restitution.65 Singer had been decided twelve years earlier and held that the
FTC was able to pursue restitution and other equitable monetary orders under section 13(b).66
This power of the FTC was also recognized in the Senate Report accompanying the 1994

62

Robert D. Paul, The FTC's Increased Reliance on Section 13(b) in Court Litigation, 57
Antitrust L.J. 141 (1988); F.T.C. v. H.N. Singer, Inc., 668 F.2d 1107 (This was the first case that acknowledged the
FTC’s power to pursue equitable relief under Section 13(b))
63

H. R. 2243, at 5 (1993).

64

See id.

65

See Singer, 668 F.2d 1107.

66

Id.
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amendments.67 The report specifically gave the FTC the ability to go into court ex parte under
Section 13 “to obtain an order freezing assets, and is also able to obtain consumer redress.”68 The
report then goes on to state that “the FTC has used its Section 13(b) injunction authority to
counteract consumer fraud, and the Committee believes that the expansion of venue and service
of process in the reported bill should assist the FTC in its overall efforts.”69 These sections
provide clear evidence that the Senate was aware of actions taken by the FTC and wanted to
expand upon these actions/abilities by expanding their venue and service of process.
This legislative history clearly indicates that Congress had no intention of limiting the
FTC’s ability to pursue equitable monetary relief under Section 13(b). Once Congress was
clearly aware that the FTC was exercising this authority, they only chose to expand their service
of process.
3. Courts of Appeals
The FTC’s ability to pursue equitable monetary orders under Section 13(b) resulted from
FTC v. H. N. Singer.70 This Ninth Circuit case arose from costly franchising agreements to
distribute frozen pizzas and ovens to retail stores.71 The FTC sought to freeze the assets of Singer
as ancillary relief to a the preliminary injunction.72 The Ninth Circuit upheld the lower court’s
order to do so because preserving those assets by freezing them was necessary for final redress. 73

67

S. Rep. 103-130 (1993).

68

Id. at 15-16.

69

Id. at 16

70

Singer, 668 F.2d 110.

71

Id. at 1109.

72

Id.

73

Id. at 1112.
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The Ninth Circuit continued on to state that since Section 13(b) allows for permanent
injunctions, “it also by implication gives the court authority to afford all necessary ancillary
relief, including rescission of contracts and restitution.” 74 Therefore, freezing assets is necessary
to ensure this a possibility. The Ninth Circuit’s justification for its decision was cited from
Brown in stating that “unless a statute in so many words, or by a necessary and inescapable
inference, restricts the court's jurisdiction in equity, the full scope of that jurisdiction is to be
recognized and applied.” 75 Following Singer, the FTC’s ability to pursue equitable monetary
orders has been continuously affirmed by circuit courts.
Three cases from recent years show that this principle is alive and well. The first of these
cases came in front of the Second Circuit. In FTC v. Moses,76 the FTC filed suit against thirteen
corporations claiming their debt collection practices violated the Federal Trade Commission
Act.77 The FTC sought a permanent injunction under Section 13(b) and disgorgement of ten
million dollars due to the defendant’s fraudulent acts.78 The court held in favor of the FTC, citing
circuit precedent, which specified that the “unqualified grant of statutory authority to issue an
injunction under Section 13(b) carries with it the full range of equitable remedies, including the
power to grant consumer redress and compel disgorgement of profits.”79

74

Id.

75

Id.

76

FTC v. Moses, 913 F.3d 297 (2d Cir. 2019).

77

Id. at 302-05.

78

Id. at 309.

79

Id. (citing FTC v. Bronson Partners, LLC, 654 F.3d 359, 365 (2d Cir. 2011)).
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The second case comes from the Ninth Circuit.80 In FTC v. AMG Capital Management,
the FTC brought action under Section 13(b) against payday lenders and the district court ordered,
on summary judgment, an injunction against the lenders as well as 1.27 billion dollars of
disgorgement.81 The Ninth Circuit affirmed, citing precedent that Section 13(b) “empowers
district courts to grant any ancillary relief necessary to accomplish complete justice, including
restitution.”82
The third case is from the Eleventh Circuit.83 In FTC v. WV Universal Management, the
FTC brought action under Section 13(b) against a credit card payment processor alleging a
fraudulent credit card interest reduction scheme.84 The district court granted summary judgment
in the FTC’s favor, granting a permanent injunction as well as disgorgement in the amount of
$1.7 million.85 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, citing prior precedent which states that
“[a]lthough [S]ection 13(b) does not expressly authorize courts to grant monetary equitable
monetary orders, this [c]ourt has held that the unqualified grant of statutory authority to issue an
injunction under [S]ection 13(b) carries with it the full range of equitable remedies, including the
power to grant consumer redress and compel disgorgement of profits.”86

80

FTC v. AMG Capital Mgmt., LLC, 910 F.3d 417 (9th Cir. 2018).

81

Id. at 422

82

Id. at 426. (citing FTC v. Commerce Planet, Inc., 815 F.3d 593, 598 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 624,
196 L.Ed.2d 515 (2017)).
83

FTC v. WV Universal Mgmt., 877 F.3d 1234 (2017).

84

Id. at 1237.

85

Id. at 1238.

86

FTC v. Gem Merch. Corp., 87 F.3d 466, 468 (11th Cir. 1996).
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These cases show that circuit courts have been willing and able to allow the FTC to
pursue ancillary equitable monetary orders under Section 13(b). They recognized that Congress
had no intention of limiting their authority to issue equitable monetary relief and continue to
issue these orders to this day.
III.

LAW & ANALYSIS

A. FTC v. Credit Bureau
Credit Bureau was a case brought by the FTC against the Credit Bureau Center, which
was offering free credit reports and scores to consumers.87 When offering these free credit
reports, the Credit Bureau Center hid a key detail that in requesting and providing these scores,
users were enrolled in a program for credit monitoring which charged them a $29.94 monthly
membership fee.88 Consumers were not notified that they were enrolled in this program until
they received a letter that they were automatically enrolled.89 In order to boost its membership,
Credit Bureau Center posted fake rental properties on Craigslist and offered free credit scores to
those who applied to live in them.90 Once they applied and obtained their credit scores, they were
also enrolled in Credit Bureau’s monthly credit monitoring service.91
When the FTC discovered Credit Bureau’s conduct, it brought action in federal court
under Section 13(b), alleging violations of consumer-protection statutes,92 and seeking a

87

Credit Bureau, 937 F.3d 764, 766.

88

Id.

89

Id.

90

Id.

91

Id.

92

Id.
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permanent injunction and restitution.93 At trial, the FTC was granted preliminary injunction and
summary judgment awarding permanent injunction and restitution of $5.2 million.94
The Seventh Circuit upheld the permanent injunction, but vacated the restitution award.95
The court reversed its own 1989 decision in Amy Travel,96 arguing that the Supreme Court had
limited “judicially implied remedies” after their determination in Meghrig.97 The Seventh Circuit
believed that Meghrig changed how courts should interpret Section 13(b) to allow for restitution
and disgorgement.98 This was because Section 13(b) did not “contemplate an award for
restitution,” and only authorized temporary and permanent injunctions, while other provisions of
the Federal Trade Commission Act authorize equitable monetary orders.99 The Seventh Circuit
also believed that allowing Section 13(b) to authorize restitution would undermine other
provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act.100 Specifically, Section 13(b) does not require
notice to defendants, as does Section 5, and broad use of Section 13(b) remedies could
undermine the use of FTC administrative proceedings that Congress evidently intended.101

93

Id.

94

FTC v. Credit Bureau Ctr., LLC, 325 F. Supp. 3d 852 (N.D. Ill. 2018).

95

937 F.3d 764, 786 (2019).

96

F.T.C. v. Amy Travel Serv., Inc., 875 F.2d 564 (7th Cir. 1989), overruled by Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Credit Bureau
Ctr., LLC, 937 F.3d 764 (7th Cir. 2019) This was an action brought under Section13(b) of the Federal Trade
Commission Act. FTC sought preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, an asset freeze, rescission, restitution and
other equitable monetary orders. The appellate court held that the trial court had the authority to grant monetary
equitable monetary orders which was necessary to effectuate a permanent injunction.
97

937 F.3d, 764, 781 (2019) (citing Meghrig v. KFC Western, 116 S. Ct. 1251, 1256 (1996).

98

Id.

99

Id. at 783.

100

Id. at 784.

101

Id.
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Chief Judge Wood dissented.102 Judge Wood’s first complaint with the majority’s
decision was that they refused to rehear the case en banc, which would have allowed all the
circuit judges to determine whether or not it was appropriate to overturn their precedent in Amy
Travel.103 The dissent also points to the fact that the SEC has been able to pursue restitution and
disgorgement in a similar fashion as the FTC, that Meghrig is distinguishable from the powers of
the FTC, and that “the non-exhaustive examples of relief Congress chose to mention in one
section do not limit what a court may or may not include pursuant to another section.”104

B. Why the FTC Should have Equitable Monetary Relief Under Section 13(b)
The FTC needs these powers to ensure it can fully protect and redress consumers who
have suffered harmed. There are many reasons why this power should be upheld; the first of
which is that even though the Supreme Court has not yet addressed this issue, the principles of
equity originally addressed in Brown v. Swann are still cited by courts to this day.105 Second,
federal agencies like the SEC and Food and Drug Administration (FDA) rely on these equitable

102

Id. at 786.

103

Id.

104

Id. at 796.

105

See Smith v. Haynes & Haynes P.C., 940 F.3d 635, 646 (11th Cir. 2019) (remanding case to district court to
apply equity principles of Brown because district court denied plaintiff’s slander claim on the basis of judicial
estoppel. “[T]he goal of equity is to secure justice, it should not be yielded to light inferences, or doubtful
construction”); see also Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass'n v. Swift Transp. Co., 367 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir.
2004) (stating that since Congress did not restrict the courts’ equitable discretion in enforcing the Truth-in-Leasing
Regulations, the district court did not err in applying equitable principles to plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary
injunction); see also Wilson v. Happy Creek, Inc., 448 P.3d 1106 (Nev. 2019) (holding that the equitable principles
in Brown applied to a case where plaintiff brought suit for the state of Nevada to restore their ground water rights.
Specifically stating “[t]he Legislature is presumed not to intend to overturn long-established principles of law when
enacting a statute.” (quoting Shadow Wood Homeowners Ass’n v. New York Cmty. Bandcorp, Inc., 366 P.3d 1105,
1112 (Nev. 2016)).
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principles in very similar manners to the FTC.106 Third, these powers allows the FTC to redress
consumers, discourage wrongful actors and avoid lengthy trials and administrative proceedings.
C. Modern Interpretation of Supreme Court Precedent
As stated above, the FTC’s powers under Section 13(b) arise from the Supreme Court
Cases Brown v. Swann, and Porter v. Warner Holding. To this day, the interpretation of these
cases has remained mostly the same.107
The most recent case where the Supreme Court addresses the holding from Brown was in
1982 in Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo.108 In this case, the Court still upheld the same principle
that unless Congress has foreclosed the use of equitable judicial remedies, these powers belong
to the courts.109 Circuit courts also still actively cite Brown when they invoke their equitable
powers.110 In 2004, the Ninth Circuit held that a district court did not err when it used an
equitable balancing test instead of issuing a preliminary injunction, because Congress did not

106

See SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1230 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that the district court had the
ability to disgorge defendant’s profits for violations of the Williams Act in a suit brought by the SEC under their
injunction provision. Specifically stating that there is “no indication in the language or the legislative history of the
1934 Act that even implies a restriction on the equitable remedies of the district courts”); See also United States v.
Universal Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 191 F.3d 750 (6th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1274 (2000) (holding that the
district court had the authority to order restitution under the FDA’s injunction provision, and specifically stating
“[a]bsent a clear command by Congress that a statute providing for equitable relief excludes certain forms of such
relief, this court will presume the full scope of equitable powers may be exercised by the courts.”).
107

See generally Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, 361 U.S. 288 (1960) has been affirmed by the Supreme
Court but is cited less often as precedent as compared to Brown or Porter. This is likely because the decision in
Mitchell was closely related to violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v.
White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (aff’g Mitchell in a dispute regarding sex discrimination and retaliation); see also Univ. of
Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 33 (2013) (aff’g Mitchell in a dispute regarding constructive discharge); see
also Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 563 U.S. 1 (2011) (aff’g Mitchell in an employer
retaliation suit).
108

Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982) (holding that the district court did not err in providing a
remedy that was more equitable than an injunction when the statute only specifically allowed for injunctions).
109

Id. at 320.

110

Swift, 367 F.3d at 1114.
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foreclose that option.111 In 2019, the Eleventh Circuit cited Brown in overturning a district
court’s summary judgment claim stating that judicial estoppel should not be invoked when it
would not be the most equitable result.112
Porter has had an even greater showing in modern Supreme Court cases. In 2015, the
Supreme Court cited the equitable principles in Porter when writing Kansas v. Nebraska.113 In
this dispute, Kansas alleged that Nebraska harmed it through excess groundwater pumping. 114
This was originally settled between the two states in 2002, but Kansas petitioned the court for
monetary and injunctive relief to remedy violation of their compact.115 The Court cited Porter
when stating that the “Court may invoke equitable principles to devise "fair . . . solution[s] to
compact violations” when issuing an injunction and disgorgement against the Nebraska.116 The
Supreme Court also cited Porter in an earlier decision in 2002.117 In this case between the United
States and a medical marijuana facility, the Court again recognized the principles of Porter,
stating that the courts’ equitable powers could only be displaced by a “clear and valid legislative
command.”118 However, the Court found that these principles could not be applied in this case
because of the language of the Controlled Substances Act.119
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Id.
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Smith v. Haynes & Haynes P.C., 940 F.3d 635, 646 (11th Cir. 2019)
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Kansas v. Nebraska, 574 U.S. 445 (2015).
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Id. at 445.
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Id.
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Id.
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United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483 (2001).
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Id. at 496.

119

Id. at 485.
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Looking at recent precedent from the Supreme Court, we can clearly see that the
equitable principles which began with Brown are still alive and well to this day. This serves as a
strong justification that the Supreme Court has no intention in Meghrig to limit a court’s ability
to issue equitable monetary relief.
D. Recent Circuit Court Decisions
Currently, every circuit except the Seventh allows for the FTC to pursue equitable
monetary orders under Section 13(b); all of which have continued to apply this principal after
Meghrig was decided in 1996.120 The most recent cases brought by the FTC regarding equitable
monetary orders under Section 13(b) that have been affirmed on appeal are FTC v. Direct Mktg.
Concepts, Inc., FTC v. Moses, and FTC v. AMG Capital Mgmt.121 These cases affirmed the
FTC’s power to pursue these orders which shows that this principle is alive and well.
Direct Mktg. Concepts was an FTC false advertising claim to challenge claims made by
Direct Marketing that its products, Coral Calcium and Supreme Greens, cured many diseases,
from cancer to Parkinson’s to obesity.122 The FTC sought an injunction and equitable monetary
relief to redress consumers who had purchased these products.123 The district court granted
summary judgment in the FTC’s favor, ordering a permanent injunction and disgorgement in the

120

FTC v. Direct Mktg. Concepts, 624 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2010); FTC v. Moses, 913 F.3d 297 (2d Cir. 2019); FTC v.
Magazine Sols., LLC, 432 F. App’x. 155 (3d Cir. 2011); Ross, 743 F.3d 886 (4th Cir. 2014); FTC v. Certified
Merch. Servs., 126 F. App'x 651 (5th Cir. 2005); FTC v. Vocational Guides, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82308 (M.D.
Tenn. Nov. 9, 2006); FTC v. Sec. Rare Coin, 931 F.2d 1312 (8th Cir. 1991); FTC v. AMG Cap. Mgmt., LLC, 910
F.3d 417 (9th Cir. 2018); FTC v. Freecom, 401 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir. 2005); FTC v. WV Universal Mgmt., 877 F.3d
1234 (11th Cir. 2017); In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate, 289 F.3d 98 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
121

See Direct Mktg. Concepts, 624 F.3d 1 (2010); Moses, 913 F.3d 297 (2019); AMG Cap. Mgmt., LLC, 910 F.3d at
417 (2018).
122

Direct Mktg. Concepts, 624 F.3d at 4.

123

Id. at 6.
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amount of $49 million.124 The First Circuit affirmed, stating that the Federal Trade Commission
Act’s “grant of authority to provide injunctive relief carries with it the full range of equitable
remedies, including the power to grant consumer redress.”125
In FTC v. Moses, the FTC charged thirteen separate defendants with violations of the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act.126 The defendants’ businesses largely consisted of collecting
payday loans which had been purchased from creditors and compiled into debt portfolios.127 In
order to collect on these debts, the defendants would claim that they were investigators and
threaten criminal actions against debtors, alleging that the debtors had committed fraud, and
would routinely contact the debtors’ family members, employers, and friends in order to try to
force debtors into paying these fake debts.128 The district court granted the FTC’s motion for
summary judgment, ordering a permanent injunction as well as disgorgement in the amount of
$11 million dollars.129 The Second Circuit affirmed, stating that the FTC’s “authority to issue an
injunction under Section 13(b) carries with it the full range of equitable remedies, including the
power to grant consumer redress and compel disgorgement of profits.”130 The Second Circuit
now requires the FTC to show a reasonable approximation of the defendant’s unjust gains, which
the defendant may then attempt to disprove.131 It also requires the FTC to show that consumers
124

Id.

125

Id. at 15.
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913 F.3d at 301 (2019).
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Id. at 302.
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Id.
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FTC v. Fed. Check Processing, Inc., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141998 at 18-38 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 2016).
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913 F.3d at 310-11 (2019).

131

Id. at 309.
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relied upon the misrepresentation at issue.132 In this case, the FTC had presented five hundred
consumer reports regarding defendants’ practices, which was enough fulfill the FTC’s burden.
FTC v. AMG Capital Management was a case brought by the FTC against another
payday lender alleging that the terms of the loan did not match the terms which the defendant
enforced against debtors when collecting on their loans.133 The district court granted summary
judgment in the FTC’s favor, granting a permanent injunction as well as restitution in the amount
of $1.27 billion to redress consumers.134 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s
determination.135 The Ninth Circuit affirmed, citing Porter for the view that courts may “deprive
defendants of their unjust gains from past violations, unless the Act restricts that authority.”136
When looking at these three cases it is important to notice that not a single case discusses
Meghrig. The Seventh Circuit’s decision to limit the FTC’s authority through Meghrig was novel
and the argument was raised by Credit Bureau in their appellate brief. Therefore, as we can see
from these cases, circuit courts still adhere to precedent in allowing the FTC to pursue equitable
monetary orders under Section 13(b). This power allows the FTC to enjoin defendants and
ensures that victims of wrongful acts are compensated on summary judgment instead of initiating
lengthy hearings.
E. The SEC and FDA Rely on the Same Equitable Principles

132

Id. at 310.
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910 F.3d 421 (2018).
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Id. at 422.
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Id. at 428.
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Id. at 427.
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Both the SEC and the FDA rely on the same judicially implied equitable powers and
pursue violations identically to the FTC under Section 13(b). This shows that the equitable
powers originally established in Brown are universally interpreted and other agencies are
afforded the same powers as the FTC.
The SEC has been statutorily empowered to pursue a wide range of remedies against
those who violate securities laws. These remedies include injunctions137, administrative ceaseand-desist orders138, monetary penalties139, and barring conduct as well as suspensions from
service as a public company officer.140 Congress never explicitly included disgorgement among
the remedies that the SEC could pursue in federal court, but this power has been given to the
SEC in a similar manner as the FTC.141 Courts have held that disgorgement and restitution are
available as ancillary relief to courts when they have been given the power by statute to provide
injunctive relief.142
The statute which gives the SEC the power to pursue these injunctions is Section
78u(d)(1) of the Securities Act.143 The language of the Securities Act states:
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Securities Act of 1933 § 20(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (2012); Securities Exchange Act of
1934 § 21(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(1). 8 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 77h-l(a), 78u (2020).
138

15 U.S.C. §§ 77h-l(a), 78u-3(a) (2020).

139

15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(d), 78u(d)(3) (2020).

140

15 U.S.C. § 77h-l(f), 77t(e) (bars and suspensions from service as public company officer
or director); 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2), 78u-3(f) (same): 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4), (b)(6) (bars and suspensions from
service as or association with broker-dealers); Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 203(e), (f), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(e)
to (f) (2012) (bars and suspensions from service as or association with investment advisers).
141

Russell G. Ryan, The Equity Facade of SEC Disgorgement, 4 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. Online 1, 2 (2013).

142

SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1230 (D.C. Cir. 1989); United States v. Bank, 378 F.Supp.3d 451,
453 (E.D.Va.2019).
143

15 U.S.C § 78u(d)(1).
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Whenever it shall appear to the [SEC] that any person is engaged or is about to
engage in acts or practices constituting a violation of any provision of this chapter
. . . it may in its discretion bring an action in the proper district court of the United
States . . . to enjoin such acts or practices, and upon a proper showing a permanent
or temporary injunction or restraining order shall be granted without bond. The
[SEC] may transmit such evidence as may be available concerning such acts or
practices as may constitute a violation of any provision of this chapter or the rules
or regulations thereunder to the Attorney General, who may, in his discretion,
institute the necessary criminal proceedings under this chapter.144
This is very similar to the language of Section 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act,
which states
Upon a proper showing that, weighing the equities and considering the [FTC]’s
likelihood of ultimate success, such action would be in the public interest, and after
notice to the defendant, a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction
may be granted without bond: Provided, however, That if a complaint is not filed
within such period (not exceeding 20 days) as may be specified by the court after
issuance of the temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction, the order or
injunction shall be dissolved by the court and be of no further force and effect:
Provided further, That in proper cases the [FTC] may seek, and after proper proof,
the court may issue, a permanent injunction.145
Both have the language that the commissions can issue preliminary injunctions upon a proper
showing after weighing the likelihood of ultimate success and then issue permanent injunctions
if necessary.
There are some differences between these two provisions. The SEC’s provision allows
for the evidence to be transmitted to the Attorney General for criminal proceedings, and the
FTC’s preliminary injunctions expire after twenty days if a complaint is not filed. While these
differences do exist, what allows the SEC and the FTC to have the implied power to receive
equitable monetary orders under their injunctive provisions is their ability to receive final

144

Id.
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15 U.S.C 53(b).
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judgments in court in the form of permanent injunctions. This goes back to the Supreme Court’s
concept of complete justice in Brown and Porter. According to the Supreme Court, if Congress
does not clearly restrict the ability of courts to issue orders in equity, they have the power to do
so as ancillary relief.
The SEC’s ability to pursue disgorgement and restitution under their injunction provision
has also been challenged similarly to Section 13(b).146 Courts have generally held that the SEC
can pursue equitable forms of relief as long as it is not pursued purely for punitive purposes.147
Challenges to the SEC’s disgorgement power are still arising to this day with the Supreme Court
hearing a case as recently as March 3, 2020, regarding whether the SEC is able to pursue
disgorgement as ancillary relief.148 News coverage of oral arguments seem to agree that the
Supreme Court is extremely likely to uphold SEC disgorgement power due to questions at oral
argument, including Justice Ginsburg’s question of is it “not an equitable principle that no one
should be allowed to profit from his own wrong?”149

146

Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635 (2017) (stating that the five-year statute of limitations applies to disgorgement by
the SEC because it is a penalty. The SEC was pursuing disgorgement as ancillary relief to an injunction against two
investment firms which were misappropriating funds); SEC v. Gentile, 939 F.3d 549 (3d Cir. 2019) (affirming in the
Third Circuit disgorgement as ancillary relief to an injunction. Specifically stating “unless Congress clearly states an
intention to the contrary, statutory injunctions are governed by the same “established principles” of equity that have
developed over centuries of practice.”); SEC v. Contorinis, 743 F.3d 296 (2d Cir. 2014) (affirming in the Second
Circuit disgorgement order as ancillary relief to an injunction citing FTC v. Bronson.)
147

137 S. Ct. 1635 (2017).
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140 S. Ct. 451 (2019), certiorari granted, appealing SEC v. Liu, 754 F. App'x 505 (9th Cir. 2018).
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Andrew Chung, U.S. Supreme Court leans toward SEC's power to recover ill-gotten gains, Reuters, (March 3,
2020) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-sec/u-s-supreme-court-leans-toward-secs-power-to-recover-illgotten-gains-idUSKBN20Q2LN; Dave Michaels, Supreme Court Justices Indicate They May Further Narrow SEC’s
Enforcement Authority, The Wall St. J., (March 3, 2020) https://www.wsj.com/articles/supreme-court-justicesindicate-they-may-further-narrow-secs-enforcement-authority-11583265540.
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Since the 1990s, the FDA has likewise secured restitution as ancillary to injunctions
under Section 332(a) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA),150 though some
courts have denied it disgorgement relief.151 The FDCA sets out three FDA remedies: seizures,152
injunctions,153 and criminal prosecution.154 Their purpose was to remove noncompliant products
from the market, prohibit manufacturing or distribution of these products, and punish those who
violated the act.155 After a series of lawsuits in the early 1990s, the FDA realized that these
actions were not always appropriate or effective for achieving their goals and began pursuing
restitution and disgorgement in order to accomplish their goals.156
Section 332 of the FDCA states that “[t]he district courts of the United States and the
United States courts of the Territories shall have jurisdiction, for cause shown to restrain
violations of [S]ection 331.”157 This section is significantly different from the injunction
provisions for the FTC and the SEC. Even with this difference courts have allowed the FDA to
pursue equitable monetary relief, because this section permits the FDA to receive permanent

150

15 U.S.C § 332(a) (2020); Restitution in Food and Drug Enforcement, 4 STAN. L. REV. 519, 521 (1951-1952);
William W. Vodra & Arthur N. Levine, Anchors Away: The Food and Drug Administration's Use of Disgorgement
Abandons Legal Moorings, 59 Food & Drug L.J. 1, 2 (2004).
United States v. Universal Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 999 F. Supp. 974 (N.D. Ohio 1997), afff’d 191 F.3d 750 (6th Cir.
1999).
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21 U.S.C. § 334.
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Id. at § 332.
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Id. at § 333.
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Vodra supra note 2.
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21 U.S.C § 332.
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injunctions from courts.158 As the Court stated in Porter, “[u]nless a statute in so many words, or
… inescapable inference, restricts the court’s jurisdiction in equity, the full scope of that
jurisdiction is to be recognized and applied.” This means that because the FDCA did not
foreclose the FDA from receiving equitable monetary, courts have the power to issue them.
In United States v. Lane Labs, the Third Circuit found the same judicially implied power
of restitution that courts have found under FTCA Section 13(b).159 This case involved three
health products produced by Lane Labs which they claimed could cure cancer and treat other
diseases like HIV.160 They marketed their products broadly through magazines, paid doctors to
endorse their products, and wrote books about the health benefits that their product did not
actually provide.161 The FDA sought permanent injunction and restitution for those who
purchased their products as well as disgorgement of their profits.162 The district court granted the
FDA’s motion for summary judgment, granting both the permanent injunction as well as
restitution. The Third Circuit upheld the order for restitution, citing both Porter and Mitchell.163
This was because “Congress has placed no unambiguous restriction on equity jurisdiction under
[Section] 332(a)” and therefore district courts are empowered to use equitable monetary orders
when appropriate.164

158

United States v. Regenerative Scis., LLC, 741 F.3d 1314 (D.C. Cir. 2014) A permanent injunction was granted
under FDCA § 332 when the defendant violated FDCA 331(k) by violating drug manufacturing regulations when
producing a stem cell therapy.
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United States v. Lane Labs-USA Inc., 427 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2005).
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Id. at 221.
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Id. at 222.
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F. Policy Justifications for Restitution and Disgorgement Under Section 13(b)
Policy favors monetary relief under Section 13(b). First and foremost, the ability to
pursue restitution and disgorgement allows the FTC to complete cases at the summary judgment
stage instead of initiating lengthy trials or administrative law proceedings under Section 19.
Second, it allows the FTC to fully redress consumers who have been harmed by the actions of
wrongdoers. Third, it discourages future wrongful actors because of the fear of restitution and
disgorgement in addition to permanent injunctions.
Speed and flexibility are major advantages of pursuing monetary relief. Because Section
13(b) authorizes permanent injunctions, it effectively authorizes restitution or disgorgement at
summary judgment.165 This is because Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 56 authorizes
summary judgement if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to [summary judgment].”166 When the FTC obtains a preliminary injunction against a
party, the court looks at the current evidence to weight “the Commission’s likelihood of ultimate
success.”167 If this evidence is great enough, then the FTC can move for summary judgment
under FRCP 56, requesting permanent injunction and restitution or disgorgement. This means
that the FTC is able to avoid the lengthy process required by Section 19, which involves three
separate legal proceedings:168 (1) a preliminary injunction under 13(b); (2) an administrative
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See FTC v. Direct Mktg. Concepts, Inc. 624 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2010); see also FTC v. Moses, 913 F.3d 297 (2d Cir.
2019); see also FTC v. AMG Capital Mgmt., LLC 910 F.3d 417 (9th Cir. 2018).
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
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15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (1994).
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See J. Howard Beales III, STRIKING THE PROPER BALANCE: REDRESS UNDER SECTION 13(B) OF THE
FTC ACT, 79 Antitrust L.J. 1, 3 (2013) (citing David M. Fitzgerald, The Genesis of Consumer Protection Remedies
Under Section 13(b) of the FTC Act, 11-12,
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/FTC%2090th%20Anniversary%20Symposium/fitzg
eraldremedies.pdf (last visited on November 15, 2020) (“To obtain complete final relief, the Commission would
need to litigate and win three separate actions: (1) a Section 13(b) preliminary injunction proceeding to obtain a
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proceeding and final cease and desist order, and; (3) a district court action to obtain redress under
Section 19.169 By allowing the FTC to receive equitable monetary orders under Section 13(b),
this three-step process is reduced to one step, which allows for a much more efficient use of our
limited agency and judicial resources. To counter this, it may be argued that Congress intended
the FTC to go through a slow process, but this argument is flawed. No matter how many steps
the FTC must go through, it is still held to the same preponderance of the evidence standard.
Section 19 proceedings are logical for cases which do not have an imminent risk of continued
harm requiring a preliminary injunction, and currently, there are over a thousand cases currently
going through administrative proceedings with the FTC.170
Allowing equitable monetary relief under Section 13(b) also allows for consumers to be
properly redressed when wrongful acts have been committed against them. This is similar to
what is allowed by Section 19, although Section 19 does not allow for preliminary and
permanent injunctions to be issued- only final cease and desist orders.171 When this is taken into
consideration with the efficiency mentioned above, by avoiding two additional judicial
proceedings, consumers are able to be redressed in a much quicker timeframe. This expedited
redressability can be extremely important when those who are wronged are vulnerable parties.
The FTC often brings actions against payday lenders who are known to victimize consumers and

preliminary asset freeze; (2) an administrative proceeding leading to a final cease and desist order; and (3) a district
court action to obtain consumer redress under Section 19.”); see also Id.at 19 (describing such a “three-part process”
as ““lengthy and cumbersome” and noting that “[t]he permanent injunction proviso of Section 13(b) ... offered a
much more effective and efficient weapon against fraud”).
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disproportionally harm those who are indigent.172 Freezing assets and pre-judgment interest can
only help so much when those harmed need financial assistance. This is exactly what happened
in both Moses and AMG Capital Mgmt.173 The power to order injunctions and issue monetary
relief in an efficient manner is critical in cases like these two, because it allows the FTC to
minimize the damage that was done and allows consumers to move on with their lives.
Allowing equitable monetary orders under Section 13(b) discourages wrongful acts
because firms will fear action being brought against them by the FTC. Section 19 specifically
states “nothing in this subsection is intended to authorize the imposition of any exemplary or
punitive damages.”174 This means that when the FTC brings action under Section 19, the most
any firm has to fear losing is the amount in which they have defrauded consumers.
However, this is not the case under Section 13(b). As stated by the Ninth Circuit in Gem
Merchandising “[S]ection 19(b), . . . is distinguishable from [S]ection 13(b) because it explicitly
prohibits ‘exemplary or punitive damages.’ This legislative command expressly limits a court’s
equitable jurisdiction. In contrast, [S]ection 13(b) has no such limitation.”175 Gem Merchandising
explores this in the context of FTC v. Pantron I Corp., where the FTC not only ordered that
consumers be redressed, but disgorged the defendant of any funds they acquired in a way that
was “reasonably related” to their alleged wrongful acts.176 The threat of the FTC pursuing more
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than what was wrongfully received from consumers carries significantly more weight when the
goal is to prevent future firms from engaging in deceitful conduct.
Because of its efficiency, power of redress, and deterrence, the ability of the FTC to
pursue equitable monetary orders under Section 13(b) serves a critical role. If this power were to
be taken away from the FTC, like the Seventh Circuit has done, the FTC would be restricted in a
way that would be detrimental to everyone. Litigation against wrongful actors would take
substantially more time, which would lead to the FTC resolving fewer cases. This added length
in time to proceedings would mean that those who may be relying upon relief would have to wait
substantially longer, and those who want to commit wrongful acts would have less to dissuade
them from doing so. Therefore, it is critical that courts preserve the FTC’s power to pursue
equitable action under Section 13(b).
G. Addressing Counter Points
1. Kokesh
Opponents of Section 13(b) monetary recovery often point to the Supreme Court’s ruling
in SEC v. Kokesh.177 The SEC brought action under its injunction provision, 15 U.S.C.
78(u)(d)(1), alleging that Kokesh violated securities laws.178 The major question raised was
whether the SEC disgorgement was punitive. If it was, then the SEC disgorgement would be
subject to the federal statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2462,179 which had already run out,
and the SEC would not have been able to disgorge Kokesh.180 The Supreme Court reversed,
137 S. Ct. 1635 (2017); see generally Sean Royall, Are Disgorgement’s Days Numbered? Kokesh v. SEC May
Foreshadow Curtailment of the FTC’s Authority to Obtain Monetary Relief, ABA, Vol. 32, No. 2, 94 (2018).
177
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SEC v. Kokesh, 834 F.3d 1158, 1168 (10th Cir. 2016).

28 U.S.C. § 2462 (2020) (“the enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise, shall
not be entertained unless commenced within five years from the date when the claim first accrued”)
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holding that disgorgement obtained by the SEC is a penalty rather than necessary compensation,
and was therefore subject to the five-year statute of limitation and the SEC would not be able to
pursue disgorgement in this case.181 At the end of its opinion, the Supreme Court stated in
pertinent part that “[n]othing in this opinion should be interpreted as an opinion on whether
courts possess authority to order disgorgement in SEC enforcement proceedings,” which shows
that the Court had no intention of stripping this power from the SEC.182
The FTC distinguishes Kokesh in that, unlike the SEC, which relies primarily on the
punitive remedy of disgorgement, the FTC has used Section 13(b) mainly to secure restitution,183
and the SEC often pursues recoveries significantly larger than what victims lost, because in
addition to the disgorged profits, they often add civil penalties.184 A court likely would not find
restitution punitive, because its purpose is to “restor[e] the status quo and order[] the return of
that which rightfully belongs to the purchaser.”185 Also, as stated by the Supreme Court in Tull v.
United States, “a court in equity may award monetary restitution as an adjunct to injunctive
relief, [but] it may not enforce civil penalties.”186 Parties arguing that Kokesh applies to the FTC
believe that equitable monetary relief to be considered a penalty like SEC disgorgement was
Kokesh. If this were to happen, they could argue that Tull applies and the FTC should no longer
be able to pursue equitable monetary orders as ancillary relief to injunctions under Section 13(b).
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Indeed, most courts have held that Kokesh does not apply to the FTC. In FTC v. DirecTV,
the district court denied DirecTV’s motion to amend its complaint to assert Kokesh as a
defense.187 The court stated that Kokesh “does not support the argument that the FTC is barred
from seeking restitution: there, the Court explicitly declined to make any finding whatsoever,
much less one relevant to whether the FTC has authority to seek restitution.”188 This was because
the Supreme Court stated at the end of Kokesh that nothing in the opinion was intended to bar
SEC disgorgement.189
In FTC v. J. Williams,190 the FTC brought action against J. Williams, seeking injunction
and disgorgement for violation of Section 5 and the Telemarketing Sales Rule.191 J. Williams
asserted Kokesh as a defense, but the court refused to deviate from Eleventh Circuit precedent
and extend the logic Kokesh.192 The court specifically stated that:

[a]s a threshold matter, Kokesh did not involve [S]ection 13(b); it dealt with federal
securities law . . . [T]he Supreme Court specifically declined to address whether
courts possessed authority to order disgorgement in SEC enforcement
proceedings.... [The] Supreme Court's deliberate avoidance of this different, if
potentially analogous, issue provides no basis for this Court to disregard decades
of precedent. Even if, as the Defendants argue, the footnote “is not merely a
pronouncement of the limitations of the opinion,” it is far from an extension of the
holding in Kokesh.193
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Finally, in FTC v. Publishers Business Services,194 the FTC persuaded the court that
“[t]he question whether courts may impose equitable monetary relief was neither presented nor
answered” in Kokesh, and that because the case involved the SEC and not the FTC, Kokesh
should not apply. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, noting the Supreme Court’s admonition in Kokesh
that “[n]othing in this opinion should be interpreted as an opinion on whether courts possess
authority to order disgorgement in SEC enforcement proceedings.”195 The court also refused to
apply any statute of limitation to Section 13(b).196
It is clear to see from these cases that courts are refusing to apply Kokesh to actions
brought by the FTC. The main reason for this is simply because in Kokesh, the Supreme Court
did not remove the SEC’s power to pursue disgorgement- it merely held that the five-year statute
of limitations applies under 28 U.S.C. § 2462 when the SEC pursues disgorgement as a
penalty.197 Also another major difference between disgorgement by the SEC’s and the FTC is
that the FTC attempts to return the disgorged profits to consumers, whenever possible.198 This is
different from the SEC because when they disgorge profits, returning the funds to victims is seen
only as a secondary goal.199 Kokesh cites SEC v. Fischbach to elaborate that in many SEC
disgorgement cases, it becomes too costly to identify and create a repayment scheme for
investors, and therefore, the primary goal in the case of the SEC is to deter conduct rather than
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make those who were harmed whole again.200 This means that it is less likely that a court would
be able to find that the FTC is acting only to punish wrongdoers and would thus be less likely to
apply this statute of limitations. Kokesh was even brought as a defense by the defendant in Credit
Bureau.201 However, in this case the district court, like the other courts, refused to apply Kokesh
in a manner that would limit the power of the FTC. Therefore, it seems extremely unlikely that
courts will use Kokesh to limit the FTC’s powers.
2. Statutory Construction
Many parties continue to argue that Section 19 of the Federal Trade Commission Act limits
the authority of the FTC to pursue restitution and disgorgement under Section 13(b), in large part
because it was enacted after Section 13(b).202 Section 19(b) states:
The court in an action under subsection (a) shall have jurisdiction to grant such
relief as the court finds necessary to redress injury to consumers or other persons,
partnership, and corporations resulting from the rule violation or the unfair or
deceptive act or practice, as the case may be. Such relief may include, but shall not
be limited to, rescission or reformation of contracts, the refund of money or return
of property, the payment of damages, and public notification respecting the rule
violation or the unfair or deceptive act or practice, as the case may be; except that
nothing in this subsection is intended to authorize the imposition of any exemplary
or punitive damages.203

SEC v. Fischbach Corp., 133 F.3d 170, 175 (2d Cir. 1997) (“It would be difficult and costly to identify and locate
these shareholders, and it would be difficult to devise a coherent formula for distributing money among them…. The
primary purpose of disgorgement orders is to deter violations of the securities laws by depriving violators of their
ill-gotten gains.”)
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This section authorizes district courts to hear actions brought by the FTC seeking monetary relief
under Section 5 and actions heard “administratively by the agency and have been litigated to a
final judgment.”204
Section 19 does have some critical differences from Section 13(b). First, it authorizes
district courts to hear cases that seek redressability where the case has been litigated to final
judgment administratively. Second, it has a statute of limitations while Section13(b) has no
statute of limitations, and third, it does not authorize preliminary injunctive relief.205 The reason
why it likely does not authorize preliminary injunctive relief is because Section 19 is only to be
invoked after a final cease-and-desist order.206 If it was to be believed that Section 19 would
limit Section 13(b), David Vladeck, a former Director of FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection
and law professor, states that you create a reality where the FTC could bring the case under
“Section 13(b) and get interim relief, but … Forfeit[] any practical ability to force many
defendants to give up the ill-gotten gains. Or, . . . proceed administratively under Section 5 and
forgo interim relief in the hope that someday the Commission might obtain a disgorgement
order.”207
This argument was also rejected by the Supreme Court in its decision in Porter.208 The
defendant in Porter argued that courts are not permitted to award restitution under Section
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205(a),209 the injunction provision of the Emergency Price Control Act because a separate
provision of the Act, Section 205(e), authorized litigation to recover damages.210 The Supreme
Court held that Section 205(e) does not eliminate a court's power under Section 205(a) to award
restitution, and that these remedies “differ greatly” from the damages available under Section
205(e).211
This issue was brought up again by the Ninth Circuit in FTC v. Commerce Planet. 212 In
this case, the FTC sought injunction and monetary relief for deceptive and unfair business
practices in marketing a product which allowed individuals to sell products online.213 This
product was purely to instruct people on how to sell items on eBay. When they ordered the kit,
they were enrolled in a monthly subscription fee, which they had to take affirmative steps to
cancel and these steps were buried in the fine print of the defendant’s website.214 The district
court permanently enjoined Commerce Planet under Section 13(b) and ordered $18.2 million in
restitution.215 On appeal, the defendant argued that Section 19 foreclosed the FTC from pursuing
restitution under Section 13(b).216 The Ninth Circuit disagreed, citing Section 19(e) which states
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that “remedies provided in this section are in addition to, and not in lieu of, any other remedy or
right of action provided by State or Federal law.”217
Based on this precedent from the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit, we can clearly
see that courts did not intend for equitable monetary orders, like restitution and disgorgement, to
be foreclosed when there is a separate provision of a statute which permits damages. The
Supreme Court specifically stated that these remedies are part of securing complete justice for
those who have been wronged.
3. The Textualist Approach Taken in Credit Bureau
The final argument that needs to be addressed is the argument made by the Seventh
Circuit in Credit Bureau. The Seventh Circuit argued that the Supreme Court in Meghrig
changed how courts should be interpreting statutes regarding judicially implied powers,
believing that Section 13(b) no longer allowed for restitution and disgorgement. This belief was
caused by the language in the provision, where Section 13(b) did not “contemplate an award for
restitution” and only authorized temporary and permanent injunctions, while other provisions of
the Federal Trade Commission Act do authorize equitable monetary relief.218 The Seventh
Circuit also believed that allowing Section 13(b) to authorize restitution would undermine other
provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act.219 Because the Act does not require the FTC to
give notice to defendants, as required by Section 5, there would no longer be a need for
administrative proceedings if the FTC was able to obtain restitution while pursuing injunctions,
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and Section 13(b) has no statute of limitation while Section 19 has a three -ear statute of
limitation.220
Meghrig v. KFC Western asked whether Section 7002 of the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act of 1976221 authorized a private cause of action to recover the prior costs of
cleaning up toxic waste that no longer endangers the environment.222 In answering this issue, the
Supreme Court interpreted the Act’s citizen suit provision to reach only imminent and substantial
harms.223 This meant that the suit by plaintiffs, for past pollution which had already been cleaned
up, could not recover restitution for completed clean-up.224 The Court determined this by looking
at the language in the citizen suit provision and believing that it only focused on the restraint of
ongoing clean-up and disposal problems, not on past clean-up costs. 225
The most obvious difference between Meghrig and Credit Bureau was explained by
Chief Judge Wood in his dissent. She argued that Meghrig was a case of pure statutory
interpretation and Credit Bureau was a case of judicially implied powers.226 While both cases
involved restitution, Meghrig concerned only whether the statute, which authorized restitution
when there was “an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment,”
required that the endangerment had to be ongoing at the time of suit.227 Chief Judge Wood
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specifically stated that “[g]eneral rules about equitable powers were of no importance for a
statute that drew the temporal line at problems that are imminent and substantial.”228 Chief Judge
Wood believed the Supreme Court only intended to determine whether the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act required imminent harm to be present, and did not intend to
rework implied judicial powers since the Court was denying Meghrig the ability to pursue
restitution which was explicitly authorized under Section 7002.
Another substantial issue for this argument is that Meghrig was decided in 1996, but the
Supreme Court reaffirmed the traditional equitable principles of Porter as recently as 2015.229 In
Kansas v. Nebraska, the Court recognized that “court[s] may invoke equitable principles to
devise ‘fair . . . solution[s]’ to compact violations.”230 The Supreme Court also cited Porter in
2002 in United States v. Oakland Cannabis,231 stating that courts’ equitable powers could only
be displaced by a “clear and valid legislative command.”232
In regard to the FTC pursuing equitable monetary orders under Section 13(b), there has
been no clear and valid legislative command stating otherwise. As stated by the Ninth Circuit,
Section 19(e) states “remedies provided in this section are in addition to, and not in lieu of, any
other remedy or right of action provided by State or Federal law.”233
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Chief Judge Wood also noted that Meghrig involved two private plaintiffs, while Credit
Bureau involved government action against a private defendant. 234 As stated in Porter, “when
the public interest is involved in a proceeding, a court’s equitable powers assume an even
broader and more flexible character than when only a private controversy is at stake.”235 When
the government is seeking remedies, they are trying to undue public harm and prevent further
ones through deterrence.236
When viewing all precedent and differences between Meghrig and Credit Bureau, it is
inappropriate that the Seventh Circuit was willing to overturn over 30 years of precedent which
began with Amy Travel.237 The standing Supreme Court precedents from Porter and Mitchell as
well as the Seventh Circuit’s refusal to hear the case en banc shows that the Seventh Circuit was
looking for any excuse they could to limit the FTC’s power.238

IV.

CONCLUSION

The Seventh Circuit decided to grossly deviate from the other eleven circuits in their
decision in Credit Bureau. It ignored the legislative history of Section 13(b), ignored valid
Supreme Court precedent, ignored all policy reasons for the FTC to have this power, and even
overturned its own longstanding precedent without hearing the case en banc. Requiring the FTC
to resort to Section 19 leaves the FTC in a similar position it was in before 1973. The FTC will
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be less efficient with their limited resources, their ability to discourage future wrongful acts will
be weakened, and those who need to be redressed will have to wait even longer.
The FTC pursing equitable monetary orders under Section 13(b) is not an abuse of its
powers. This provision allows the FTC to enjoin malicious conduct and then redress those who
have been harmed. Often, the firms that are violating the FTCA are hurting some of the most
vulnerable members of our society. These firms falsely advertise medicine,239 intimidate those
who are in debt,240 and deceive consumers into paying fees they cannot afford.241 The FTC’s
power to pursue equitable monetary orders creates real consequences for those who intend to
harm and deceive us, and it is unclear why the Seventh Circuit is trying protect wrongdoers. The
Ninth and Tenth Circuits are currently rejecting this interpretation by the Seventh Circuit, and
hopefully this error on their part can be corrected before too much damage is done.242
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